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Text
[*253]
Introduction
In 2014, the American Bar Association (ABA) enacted new Standards for the Accreditation of Law Schools
(Standards) focusing on outcomes assessment, which require a change in law schools' traditional pedagogy. This
change is a seismic shift, requiring formative assessment throughout the curriculum, a major step away from law
schools' traditional reliance on the Socratic Method with one high stakes, summative final exam.
Law faculty and legal scholars have resisted this change for various reasons, including: the perceived importance of
high stakes assessment in preparation for the bar exam; the reality that there is no "second chance" in a courtroom;
and the belief (whether accurate or not) that higher order skills taught in law school, especially critical thinking, are
not subject to assessment. These, and other reasons, are often couched in terms of academic freedom 1 and have
stirred up many questions. For example, have other faculty members complained of infringement on their academic
freedom rights caused by the assessment movement? 2 Is there legal precedent to such claims?

1

See, e.g., Mary A. Lynch, An Evaluation of Ten Concerns About Using Outcomes in Legal Education, 38 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev.
976, 990-995 (2012); see also Susan Hanley Duncan, The New Accreditation Standards Are Coming to Law School Near You What You Need to Know About Learning Outcomes & Assessment, 16 Legal Writing: J. Legal Writing Inst. 605, 609 (2010);
Steven I. Friedland, Outcomes and the Ownership Conception of Law School Courses, 38 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 947, 964-965
(2012) ("The imposition of learning outcomes does not impact either the spirit or letter of academic freedom, … the subject of
academic freedom will more likely be used as an obstacle or shield to resist change.").
2

The American Association of University Professors claims that the issue has not received much attention. Mandated
Assessment of Educational Outcomes: A Report of Committee C on College and University Teaching, Research, and
Publication, Academe (A.A.U.P., Washington D.C.), Jul.-Aug. 1991, at 49, 49-54 ("The direct implications of mandated
assessment for academic freedom and tenure have not yet become a centerpiece of public discussion."). But see Michael Stein
et al., Market Forces and the College Classroom: Losing Sovereignty, 4 AAUP J. Acad. Freedom no. 1, 2013, at 8 (noting that
"an aspect of academic freedom - the sovereignty of the classroom - is being lost, or at least compromised"); Jordan J. Titus,
Pedagogy on Trial: When Academic Freedom and Education Consumerism Collide, 38 J.C. & U.L. 107, 164 (2011) ("These are
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[*254] This Article seeks to answer these questions by exploring one discrete, narrow issue within the academic
freedom quandary: whether the new assessment mandates in the ABA's Standards, when implemented by an
institution, violate law faculty members' academic freedom rights involving classroom speech, specifically teaching
methods. 3 In order to explore this issue, this Article looks at the definition of academic freedom. Next, it delves into
the new ABA Standards and the interpretations and guidance memos associated therewith. With the foundation
laid, the Article will then analyze whether the new Standards, as implemented by law schools, violate law faculty
members' academic freedom rights. The Article concludes by proposing methods by which to ensure that a violation
does not happen.
I. Background
A. The Origins of Academic Freedom
Academic freedom symbolizes the unique place that university faculty 4 occupy in the West. However, its definition
is far from clear; its origin is somewhat murky, and its scope and parameters are less than exact. Academic
freedom has been discussed for centuries, dating back to Plato's [*255] discourse on the utopian society of the
academic community. 5 If asked, most individuals would come up with a similar definition for academic freedom - a
right of individual faculty members to teach, speak, and research on any subject, including controversial subjects,
free from external pressure or influence. However, such a simple definition belies the true roots and complexities of
academic freedom. Many would be surprised to know that there is disagreement as to whether there is such a right
at all, where it comes from, and if it does exist, to whom it belongs.
1. The American Association of University Professors
The first clear enunciation of academic freedom rights for faculty at American institutions arose in the 1915 and
1940 statements by the American Association of University Professors (AAUP). The 1915 Declaration of Principles
of Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure provided that "academic freedom in this sense comprises three
elements: freedom of inquiry and research; freedom of teaching within the university or college; and freedom of

dangerous times for the professoriate. If faculty do not resist external demands and administrative monitoring, their residual
freedom to define the curriculum, decide pedagogical strategies, and determine standards of student achievement will be
eviscerated."); but cf. Timothy Reese Cain, NILOA Occasional Paper 22, Assessment and Academic Freedom: In Concert, not
Conflict, 4 (Nov. 2014), http://www.learningoutcomesassessment.org/ documents/OccasionalPaper22.pdf. Cain concedes that
"outcomes assessment can be undertaken in ways that violate faculty rights and negate their legitimate control of the college
curriculum," but rejects "the idea that learning outcomes assessment inherently tramples academic freedom." Id. at 4-5. Cain
also outlines the arguments made by other authors, who claim that assessment violates academic freedom. Id. at 10-11.
3

This Article does not explore the impact of assessment mandates on an institution's academic freedom rights, nor does this
Article explore the violation of other individual academic freedom rights relating to research or extramural speech but deals
specifically with classroom teaching methods and speech. See Denise S. Smith & Michael A. Katz, Academic Freedom in the
Age of Assessment and Accountability, 22 Midwest L.J. 1, 4 (2008) (noting that in addition to the two dimensions of academic
freedom: individual and institutional, the rights can be separately categorized as "(1) the academic rights of the institution versus
the government's rights; (2) the academic rights of the individual versus the government's rights; and (3) the academic rights of
the individual versus the academic institution's rights") (citations omitted). This Article deals solely with the latter dimension.
4

This Article is limited to the discussion of university faculty, specifically law school faculty, and does not address the academic
freedom rights of teachers generally.
5

This Article does not explore the various permutations and origins of the right of academic freedom, including state
constitutional law, contract law, and statutory law, nor the viability of a faculty member's claim of violation of such rights in a court
proceeding. For a comprehensive study of the origins and history of academic freedom, see Lawrence White, Fifty Years of
Academic Freedom Jurisprudence, 36 J.C. & U. L. 791 (2010). See also Philip Lee, Academic Freedom at American
Universities: Constitutional Rights, Professional Norms, and Contractual Duties (2015), for a thorough discussion of the various
sources of academic freedom and the issues surrounding each.
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extra-mural utterance and action." 6 It reiterated this position stating that "it is, in short, not the absolute freedom of
utterance of the individual scholar, but the absolute freedom of thought, of inquiry, of discussion and of teaching, of
the academic profession." 7
In 1940, the AAUP, along with the Association of American Colleges, drafted the 1940 Statement of Principles on
Academic Freedom and Tenure. 8 The 1940 Statement addressed a gap in the 1915 Declaration of Principles:
faculty speech critical of the institution, its policies, or its governing bodies, finding that such speech was included in
the profession's understanding of academic freedom. 9 The 1940 Statement clarified that "academic freedom …
applies to both teaching and research … [and that academic freedom] carries with it duties correlative with rights."
10 The [*256] 1940 Statement also recognized limits to academic freedom for religious or "other aims" of the
institution, which "should be clearly stated in writing at the time of the [faculty] appointment." 11
Almost all American institutions of higher education endorse the 1940 Statement, typically incorporating it into
faculty handbooks and employment contracts. 12 Even if not explicitly adopted by such institutions, the 1940
Statement is often seen as "widely shared norms within the academic community, having achieved acceptance by
organizations which represent teachers as well as organizations which represent administrators and governing
boards." 13
Courts have cited the 1940 Statement as persuasive authority in tenure and academic freedom decisions. 14 In
1971, the United States Supreme Court in Tilton v. Richardson, referenced the AAUP's 1940 Statement, specifically
characterizing the institution at issue as existing in an "atmosphere of academic freedom," because, in part, it
subscribed to the 1940 Statement. 15 Although courts reference the origins of academic freedom in the 1940
Statement, courts also have rooted academic freedom in the First Amendment.
2. The First Amendment
In Sweezy v. State of New Hampshire, the Court in a Plurality Opinion recognized for the first time academic
freedom involving a faculty member. 16 The Court noted that the faculty member had "liberties in the areas of

6

The American Association of University Professors, AAUP's 1915 Declaration of Principles 1 (1915), http://www.aaupui.org/Documents/Principles/ Gen_Dec_Princ.pdf.
7

Id. at 10.

8

Protecting an Independent Faculty Voice: Academic Freedom after Garcetti v. Ceballos, Academe (AAUP, Washington, D.C.),
Nov.-Dec. 2009, at 67, 70 [hereinafter AAUP Article], https://www.aaup.org/file/Protecting-Independent-Voice.pdf.
9

Id.

10

1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure with 1970 Interpretative Comments, AAUP Bull., Jun. 1974,
at 13, 14 [hereinafter AAUP Bulletin], https://www.aaup.org/report/1940-statement-principles-academic-freedom-and-tenure
("Academic freedom in its teaching aspect is fundamental for the protection of the rights of the teacher in teaching and of the
student to freedom in learning.").
11

Id.

12

AAUP Article, supra note 8, at 70.

13

Browzin v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 527 F.2d 843, 848 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

14

See, e.g., Vega v. Miller, 273 F.3d 460, 476 (2d Cir. 2001); Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 411 (4th Cir. 2000); Browzin,
527 U.S. at 848 n.8.
15

Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 681 (1971).

16

Sweezy v. State of New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
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academic freedom … in which government should be extremely reticent to tread." 17 In sweeping language, the
Court reiterated that it could not "conceive of any circumstance wherein a state interest would justify infringement of
rights in these fields." 18 However, more well-known are the statements in Justice Frankfurter's Concurrence, in
which he referenced ""the four essential freedoms of a university - to determine for itself on academic grounds who
may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.'" 19 A decade later, in
Keyishian [*257] v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., a Majority of the Court, for the first time, noted the
First Amendment underpinnings of academic freedom, finding it a "special concern of the First Amendment, which
does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom." 20
The Court's recognition of an academic freedom right confused to whom the right belongs: the institution 21 or the
faculty member. 22 Arguably, the four rights identified in Sweezy's Concurrence equate with a university, not an
individual faculty member, and later opinions by the Court both reinforced and contradicted this finding. 23 Lower
courts have only blurred that distinction. For example, the Fourth Circuit in Urofsky v. Gilmore, stated "to the extent
that the Constitution recognizes any right of "academic freedom' above and beyond the First Amendment rights to
which every citizen is entitled, the right inheres in the University, not in individual professors." 24
In addition to inconsistent treatment by the courts to whom the right belongs, locating the right in the First
Amendment further complicates the issues. First, it limits the rights of faculty at private institutions, who may be
foreclosed from asserting the right due to a lack of state action. 25 [*258] Second, the rights of faculty at public
institutions may be restricted under Garcetti v. Ceballos in which the Supreme Court held that speech by public
employees made pursuant to their official duties was not protected by the First Amendment. 26 Third, and
specifically focusing on assessment, questions exist as to whether mandated assessments in the classroom should
be considered speech or even expressive conduct for First Amendment purposes or whether the assessments
could be considered non-expressive conduct. 27 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, and of concern to all

17

Id. at 250.

18

Id. at 251.

19

Id. at 263 (quoting University of Cape Town and University of the Witwatersrand, The Open Universities in South Africa
(Johannesburg: Witwatersrand U. Press, 1957), 10-12); see also White, supra note 5, at 810 ("Justice Frankfurter's concurrence
in Sweezy remains to this day the fullest treatment ever accorded the principle of academic freedom in a Supreme Court case,
and its quadripartite delineation of "the four essential freedoms' at the core of the principle is almost invariably the starting point
for analysis when faculty members invoke their right to academic freedom.").
20

Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 602 (1967); see also J. Peter Byrne, Academic
Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amendment," 99 Yale L.J. 251, 298 (1989) (noting that Sweezy and Keyishian
"exhaust the Supreme Court's development of a university faculty member's right of academic freedom").
21

This Article does not address an institution's right to assert a claim of academic freedom against an accreditor for imposing
assessment mandates.
22

See White, supra note 5, at 822 ("Nothing has introduced more confusion into the case law than the schism between one line
of cases describing academic freedom as a right possessed by individual faculty members and another line recognizing
academic freedom as a right possessed by and exercised only in the name of the faculty member's employing institution.").
23

See Regents of Univ. of Cal, v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (noting that academic freedom is a "special concern of the
First Amendment" with regard to a university's right to decide who to teach); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (firmly
deferring to the institution's educational judgment).
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faculty, "what the courts give, they may take away, … academic freedom may be left in a weaker position than it
was before it became a concern of the law." 28
3. Individual Faculty Members' Academic Freedom Rights
The inability to delineate to whom the right belongs: faculty, as expressed by the AAUP, or institutions, as
expressed by Sweezy, is still a matter of debate, and an important one, as these two freedoms are inconsistent, if
not in direct conflict. 29 In earlier case law it was a distinction without a difference, as an external force was exerting
pressure on the faculty member, like in Sweezy. 30 However, as time passed, the pressures came from within
educational institutions, and the conflict was framed between the individual professor and her employing institution.
31 To date, the Supreme Court has not addressed such a situation. 32
[*259] Regardless of one's position on the origin of academic freedom, it is clear that courts have recognized, and
will likely continue to recognize, a faculty member's academic freedom rights whether under custom, the First
Amendment, or even contract law. 33 Even when recognized, most agree that there is a limit on an individual's right
to academic freedom. 34 Succinctly stated, "academic freedom does not mean academic license." 35
Individual academic freedom can include faculty's research, teaching, and extramural speech. 36 Relevant to this
Article, the focus is on an individual faculty member's classroom activities, including two different categories, which
can "cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom:" 37 classroom speech and teaching methods. 38
Regarding classroom speech, academic freedom can protect a faculty member's speech, which could include
course content, 39 as well as a faculty member's criticism of the institution and its policies. 40 As to criticism,
faculty members' rights appear strong. 41 However, courts have [*260] been willing to restrict classroom speech
when it does not further a pedagogical purpose and does not implicate matters of public concern. 42 As to content,

24

Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 411 (4th Cir. 2000); see also White, supra note 5, at 834 (noting that Urofsky is "an
exemplar of contemporary judicial hostility to claims by faculty members for special exemption from expectations of behavior that
apply to other state employees and other community members").
25

See White, supra note 5, for a thorough discussion of these issues. Even if a faculty member or an institution wanted to bring
an action against an accreditor, the First Amendment state action requirement may limit their action. See, e.g., Hiwassee Coll.,
Inc. v. The Southern Assoc. of Coll. and Sch., 531 F.3d 1333, 1335 (11th Cir. 2008) (compiling cases which found that
accrediting agencies were not state actors); Transport Careers, Inc. v. Nat'l Home Study Council, 646 F. Supp. 1474, 1478 (N.D.
Ind. 1986) (holding that association's accreditation function did not constitute state action).
26

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (holding that no First Amendment rights existed for public officials speaking
pursuant to their official duties but explicitly noting that the opinion did not decide the issue involving the academic freedom
rights of faculty members employed by public institutions).
27

See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights, 547 U.S. 47 (2006) (noting that the Solomon Amendment's requirement of
providing access to military recruiters did not violate law schools' First Amendment rights because it involved conduct, not
speech).
28

Byrne, supra note 20, at 291-292 n.150 (citing Robert K. Carr, Academic Freedom, the American Association of University
Professors, and the United States Supreme Court, AAUP Bull., Mar. 1959, at 5, 19-20 (1959)).
29
30

Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12 (1985).

See White, supra note 5, at 827 ("Pragmatically, the need to distinguish between the two strands has never been pressing
because the Supreme Court has never decided an academic freedom case in which institutions and faculty members were not
aligned. In every case, it mattered little to the outcome whether the particular "freedom' asserted - to teach, to admit students, to
conduct research - protected faculty members or institutions, because faculty and institution occupied common ground in
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the Third Circuit has stated, "a public university professor does not have a First Amendment right to decide what will
be taught in the classroom." 43
As opposed to classroom speech, which may or may not serve a pedagogical purpose, it is without a doubt that
classroom assessment activities go to the heart of what and how a faculty member teaches. Does the faculty
member exclusively use the Socratic Method and have one exam at the end of the semester? If an institution
adopts a policy, in order to comply with the new ABA Standards, and that policy requires all faculty to provide
multiple formative assessments throughout a semester, essentially foreclosing the faculty's choice to use only one
summative final exam, does that implicate a faculty member's academic freedom rights? Lower courts have
addressed that question, albeit rarely 44 and inconsistently. 45
Most courts hold that a faculty member's choice of teaching methods does not implicate an academic freedom right,
46 or if it does, an institution's right trumps the individual faculty member's right. 47 For [*261] example, in
Johnson-Kurek v. Abu-Absi, the Sixth Circuit found that a professor was required to explain course requirements to
students. 48 The court held,
While the First Amendment may protect [the professor's] right to express her ideas about pedagogy, it does not
require that the university permit her to teach her classes in accordance with those ideas. The freedom of a
university to decide what may be taught and how it shall be taught would be meaningless if a professor were
entitled to refuse to comply with university requirements whenever they conflict with his or her teaching philosophy.
49

In Hetrick v. Johnson, the Sixth Circuit reiterated its deference to institutions in actions by faculty, vowing that it is
not the place of courts to interfere with daily school operations. 50 Specifically, the Sixth Circuit found that a public
university did not violate a non-tenured professor's academic freedom rights when it chose not to renew her
contract for "displeasure with her "pedagogical attitudes.'" 51 The court stated,

seeking to repel what Professor Areen and other scholars have called "external challenges' to academic freedom - challenges
mounted by agencies and instrumentalities beyond campus boundaries.").
31

See id. at 822 ("In the last thirty years, by contrast, almost all academic freedom cases have arisen in the context of "internal
university disputes rather than threats from outside the university,' and therein lies the most profound source of doctrinal
complexity in the case law: when a faculty member alleges that his academic freedom is abridged because of a decision made
by the institution's own officials - a decision, for example, to deny tenure, or change a grade, or command that certain books be
removed from a course syllabus - then individual and institutional prerogatives collide and the outcome of the case can hinge on
which variant of academic freedom the court adopts.").
32

Id. at 827.

33

See Lee, supra note 5 (arguing that the best legal protections of an individual's academic freedom rights as asserted against
his employer is rooted in contract law).
34

See James D. Gordon III, Individual and Institutional Academic Freedom at Religious Colleges and Universities, 30 J.C. &
U.L. 1, 7 (2003) (arguing that a higher education institution's mission is to educate students and advance knowledge and that the
individual faculty member's academic freedom exists within the context of his institution's mission, which, in turn, places limits on
individual academic freedom).
35

Kay v. Bd. of Higher Educ. of N.Y., 18 N.Y.S.2d 821, 829 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940).

36

AAUP Bulletin, supra note 10; see also White, supra note 5, at 820 ("When faculty members are told what to teach, how to
teach, or where their research interests should be confined, we are closest to the nub of academic freedom.").
37

Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
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whatever may be the ultimate scope of the amorphous "academic freedom" guaranteed to our Nation's teachers
and students … it does not encompass the right of a non-tenured teacher to have her teaching style insulated from
review by her superiors when they determine whether she has merited tenured status just because her methods
and philosophy are considered acceptable somewhere within the teaching profession. 52
[*262] Additionally, in Wirsing v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Colo., a district court found that an institution could
require a faculty member to use a standardized teacher evaluation form, which went against the faculty member's
theory of education because "the evaluation forms represent a University policy and procedure unrelated to course
content that in no way interferes with [the professor's] academic freedom." 53 Stated concisely, the court found that
"academic freedom is not license for activity at variance with job-related procedures and requirements." 54
Regarding a faculty member's evaluation of students and grading activities, courts defer to an institution's policies.
55 In Parate v. Isibor, the Sixth Circuit, recognizing that the assignment of a grade by a faculty member was a
symbolic communicative act, the court held that the institution could not force the faculty member to assign a grade,
but could change the grade after it had been assigned by the faculty member. 56
Many Circuits, including the First, 57 Second, 58 Third, 59 Fifth, 60 Seventh, 61 and Eleventh, 62 have come to
the same conclusion that, as [*263] between faculty and their institution regarding teaching and grade distribution
policies, the institution prevails. 63
In finding in favor of the institution when it comes to grading and teaching methods in the classroom, the courts
generally rely on academic abstention. 64 Academic abstention is defined as "the traditional refusal of courts to
extend common law rules of liability to colleges where doing so would interfere with the college administration's
good faith performance of its core functions," 65 and is rooted in the Supreme Court's decision in Grutter v.
Bollinger. 66 Basically, "federal judges should not be ersatz [*264] deans or educators. In this regard, we trust that
the University will serve its own interests as well as those of its professors in pursuit of academic freedom." 67

38

Carley v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 737 P.2d 1099, 1101-1102 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (distinguishing cases involving speech
content at issue from cases involving classroom teaching techniques).
39

See White, supra note 5, at 791-792, who cites to the Higher Education Opportunity Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1015b, which is the only
federal legislation that mentions an individual academic freedom right. The purpose of the act, which addresses costs and
transparency of course materials, "supports the academic freedom of faculty members to select high quality course materials for
students." 20 U.S.C. § 1015b (2012).
40

AAUP Article, supra note 8, at 70.

41

Id. at 7; see, e.g., Johnson-Kurek v. Abu-Absi, 423 F.3d 590, 594 (6th Cir. 2005) ("There are limits on the extent to which a
university may require a professor to endorse actively the university's decisions about pedagogy and grading."); Wirsing v. Board
of Regents of Univ. of Colo., 739 F. Supp. 551, 554 (D. Colo. 1990) (noting that a faculty member can openly criticize her
institution's mandatory teacher evaluation form and the institution's policy requiring its use). But see Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d
928, 931 (7th Cir. 1972) (finding that a faculty member's classroom criticisms of the administration and the faculty was not
protected by the First Amendment).
42

Keen v. Penson, 970 F.2d 252, 257 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that the United States Court of Appeals "recognized the
supremacy of the academic institution in matters of curriculum content."); see also Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 820 (6th
Cir. 2001) (noting that the institution had the right to control classroom speech when it was not germane to course content).
43

44

Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 491 (3d Cir. 1998).

Cooper v. Ross, 472 F. Supp. 802, 813 (E.D. Ark. 1979) ("Case law considering the extent to which the First Amendment
and academic freedom protect a teacher's choice of teaching methodology is surprisingly sparse and the results are not entirely
consistent.") (citations omitted).
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B. Assessment Mandates in Accreditation Standards
When the ABA decided to change its accreditation Standards, it chose to do so based upon reliable evidence, like
lawyers and educational researchers often do. But, why did the ABA decide to "mandate" these changes in
accreditation? 68 In order to aptly answer this question, a brief review of the history and purpose of accreditation is
necessary and the specific Standards adopted by the ABA.
1. Accreditation Generally
Accreditation of American universities began in the nineteenth century 69 and has evolved into the current
structure of accreditation among six regional accreditors of higher education institutions, 70 as well as [*265]
accreditors of faith-based institutions, accreditors of specialized programs, like the ABA for law schools, and careerrelated accreditors. 71
Institutions may be accredited by multiple accreditors. 72 Institutions with affiliated law schools fall into this category
because regional accreditors look at all units of an institution, law schools being one such unit of a larger institution.
73 Thus, law schools that are part of a larger institution are reviewed by their larger institution's regional accreditor.
74 In addition, law schools are also accredited by the ABA. Of prime importance to this Article, all of the regional
accreditors require outcomes [*266] assessment in their standards. 75 Suffice it to say, accreditation and
assessment are "inevitable partners." 76
So, what does this means for law schools? Ultimately, two things: first, law schools, to the extent that they are not
already involved, will likely become more involved in the regional accreditation process, which requires outcomes
assessment. Second, law schools will be required to comply with the ABA accreditation Standards, discussed
below, which have been influenced by the outcomes assessment focus in the regional accreditors' standards.

45

See White, supra note 5, at 827-830 (compiling lower court cases and their inconsistent treatment); see also Richard Fossey
& Joseph C. Beckham, University Authority over Teaching Activities: Institutional Regulation may Override a Faculty Member's
Academic Freedom, 228 West's Educ. L. Rep. 1, 1, 2 (2008) (stating "lower federal courts have defined the faculty member's
academic freedom rights narrowly in relationship to teaching activities" and that these courts have "generally granted higher
education institutions a great deal of latitude, particularly when the institution seeks to regulate a faculty member's teaching
activities.").
46

See, e.g., Dambrot v. Central Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1190 (6th Cir. 1995) ("An instructor's choice of teaching methods
does not rise to the level of protected expression.") (citations omitted).
47

See, e.g., Carley v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 737 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Ariz. App. 1987) ("The University concluded that he was not
an effective teacher. It was apparently their professional opinion that his methodology was not successful. Academic freedom is
not a doctrine to insulate a teacher from evaluation by the institution that employs him."); Riggin v. Bd. of Tr. of Ball State Univ.,
489 N.E.2d 616, 630 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) ("Governing bodies of colleges, universities and other schools acting through their
deans, department heads, and duly constituted faculty committees, have a right to develop curriculum, determine course content
and impose methods of instruction. A teacher is obligated to comply with their directions in this regard."); Millikan v. Bd. of Dir.,
611 P.2d 414, 417 (Wash. 1980) (teachers sought to team-teach a history course according to their own plan, which was
"unconventional but professionally recognized methods designed to teach the students to think" but the court held that the
"board's requirement that [teachers] teach history classes in a conventional manner contrary to their own preferred teaching
philosophy is not violative of their rights.").
48

Johnson-Kurek v. Abu-Absi, 423 F.3d 590, 595 (6th Cir. 2005). See also Fossey & Beckham, supra note 45, at 6, for a full
discussion of the Johnson-Kurek case, finding that the case "is in harmony with other federal court decisions limiting a faculty
member's right to academic freedom in his or her teaching activities." Fossey and Beckham divide the lower court cases into
three categories: grading and curricular decisions, evaluation of faculty members, and classroom speech. Id. at 7. Fossey and
Beckham state that Johnson-Kurek found that "while a faculty member's right to express ideas about pedagogy may be
protected, the institution may determine what is appropriate pedagogy in meeting the needs of students." Id. at 11.
49

Johnson-Kurek, 423 F.3d at 595.
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2. The American Bar Association
The ABA adopted the first Standards for Legal Education in 1921. 77 Over the course of the past century, the
Council amended the Standards numerous times. 78 For the purposes of this Article, the most dramatic
amendments to the Standards occurred in 2014, when the Standards were amended to adopt an outcomes
assessment approach to accreditation. 79 This change was prompted by the ABA's appointment of a Special
Committee on Output Measures in 2007, which was charged with determining if the accreditation process should
involve output measures and if so, how it could be done. 80
[*267] The Special Committee released its comprehensive Report in 2008, wherein it recommended that the ABA
Standards should be revised to incorporate outcomes measures, which would align with the practices of regional
accreditors and accreditors of professional schools, and which was consistent with best practices in higher
education and in legal education. 81
* Following the issuance of the Committee's Report, the Council charged the Standards Review Committee with
reviewing the Standards in light of the Committee's recommendations and with making recommendations to the
Council. 82 The Council appointed a Student Learning Outcomes Subcommittee. 83 The Subcommittee provided
guiding principles for a shift to outcomes assessment in the Standards. 84 The principles provided that:
* The process of identifying, assessing and improving outcomes is more important than ensuring that every student
achieve each outcome. * Different types of faculty - doctrinal, clinical, legal writing and others - play important roles
in identifying and assessing learning. * Faculty should have the central role in identifying, assessing and improving
learning outcomes. * Outcomes will differ based upon law school missions. * Although the traditional legal
curriculum, which purports to teach students to "think like a lawyer," will remain at the center of law schools' J.D.
programs, schools should measure how successful their students are in mastering that skill and in bridging the gap
between it and other lawyering skills. * Focusing on outcomes should serve as a catalyst for law schools to be
intentional in curriculum development. * The focus on outcomes should shift the emphasis from what is being taught

50

Hetrick v. Johnson, 480 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1973).

51

Id. at 708.

52

Id. at 709. Although the holding was specific to a non-tenured professor, it does not appear that that fact was outcome
determinative.
53

Wirsing v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Colo., 739 F. Supp. 551, 554 (D. Colo. 1990).

54

Id. at 553 (citations omitted).

55

See, e.g., Brown v. Armenti, 247 F.3d 69, 75 (3d Cir. 2001) ("Because grading is pedagogic, the assignment of the grade is
subsumed under the university's freedom to determine how a course is taught. We therefore conclude that a public university
professor does not have a First Amendment right to expression via the school's grade assignment procedures."); see also
Wozniak v. Conry, 236 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2001). The Seventh Circuit labeled a "rebel" faculty member's refusal to follow the
institution's grading curve "insubordination." Id. at 890-891. The court stated,
no person has a fundamental right to teach undergraduate engineering classes without following the university's grading rules.
Quite the contrary, both a university and its students have powerful interests in comparability of grades across sections, for
grades are a university's stock in trade and class rank may be vital to a student's future. By insisting on a right to grade as he
pleases, [the faculty member] devalues his students' right to grades that accurately reflect their achievements.
Id. at 891.
56

Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 828 (6th Cir. 1989) ("The professor's evaluation of her students and assignment of their
grades is central to the professor's teaching method.").
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to what is being learned by the students. 85 Starting in 2008, and after many revisions, the revised Standards were
adopted in 2014, finally bringing law school accreditation in step with [*268] accreditation in other disciplines and
higher education generally. 86 The Standards that directly address outcomes assessment are Standards 301, 302,
314, 315, and 404, and are hereinafter labelled "assessment mandates." 87
Learning outcomes are the foundation of assessment practice, and the new Standards reflect their importance.
Standard 301, entitled "Objectives of Program of Legal Education" was amended to provide that "[a] law school
shall establish and publish learning outcomes … ." 88 Standard 302, a completely new Standard, provides the
required learning outcomes that all law schools must have. 89 Although seemingly a bold move, this Standard did
not truly break new ground as it is merely a restatement of former Standard 302, which provided what areas a law
student must receive "substantial instruction" in: the same general categories listed in the new Standard 302. 90
Standards 301 and 302 do not directly impact a faculty member's teaching activities. Standard 301 addresses
institutional learning outcomes; therefore, it does not directly impact a faculty member's course content or speech.
Likewise, the corollary to Standard 301, Standard 302 proposes the minimum learning outcomes that a school
should adopt, again only addressing institutional learning outcomes. Standard 302, which merely [*269] recasts
former Standard 302, has not been heretofore challenged by individual faculty members. Therefore, it is unlikely
that its recast in learning outcomes language could be said to have an impact where one was not alleged before.
Furthermore, the ABA has tempered the language in Standard 302, by providing in Interpretation 302-2 that a law
school has the ability to add any learning outcomes that are "pertinent to its program of legal education." 91
The ABA Guidance Memo, released in June 2015, addressed Standard 301 specifically, providing that "learning
outcomes for individual courses must be published in the course syllabi." 92 This assessment mandate requires
faculty to have syllabi and to list learning outcomes on the syllabi, and arguably impacts a faculty member's speech
regarding course content as well as educational philosophy.

57

See, e.g., Lovelace v. Southeastern Mass. Univ., 793 F.2d 419, 425-426 (1st Cir. 1986) ("Whether a school sets itself up to
attract and serve only the best and the brightest students or whether it instead gears its standard to a broader, more average
population is a policy decision which, we think, universities must be allowed to set. And matters such as course content,
homework load, and grading policy are core university concerns, integral to implementation of this policy decision.").
58

Vega v. Miller, 273 F.3d 460, 467-468 (2d Cir. 2001).

59

Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 491 (3d Cir. 1998); Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1176 (3d
Cir. 1990) ("No court has found that teachers' First Amendment rights extend to choosing their own curriculum or classroom
management techniques in contravention of school policies or dictates.").
60

Hillis v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 665 F.2d 547, 553 (5th Cir. 1982). The court held that a faculty member's claim that
refusal to assign a grade constituted a "teaching method" was unfounded as the institution did not require the faculty member to
review the student's work but just told to give her a passing grade. Id. The court stated "while academic freedom is well
recognized, its perimeters are ill-defined and the case law defining it is inconsistent. Its roots have been found in the first
amendment insofar as it protects against infringements on a teacher's freedom concerning classroom content and method." Id.
(citations omitted).
61

Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1972) ("We do not conceive academic freedom to be a license for uncontrolled
expression at variance with established curricular contents and internally destructive of the proper functioning of the institution.").
62

Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1074 (11th Cir. 1991) ("As a place of schooling with a teaching mission, we consider a
University's authority to reasonably control the content of its curriculum, particularly that content imparted during class time.").
63

However, not all courts are so restrictive. See, e.g., Dube v. State Univ. of N.Y., 900 F.2d 587, 598 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Assuming
the [institution] retaliated against [the faculty member] based on the content of his classroom discourse, such conduct was, as a
matter of law, objectively unreasonable.").
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Standard 314 is also a completely new standard and requires law schools to engage in formative and summative
assessment to provide evidence of student learning and requires schools to provide feedback to students. 93
Standard 315 requires that, in addition to the formative and summative assessment of student learning, a law
school is required to assess its assessment, by reviewing its own assessment activities to evaluate student learning
and progression on the learning outcomes. 94
The major focus from the academy to date has been on the outcomes Standards 301, 302, 314, and 315. 95
However, the lesser-mentioned Standard 404 also addresses faculty responsibility for assessment of student
learning. Specifically, Standard 404 states, in pertinent part:
(a) A law school shall adopt, publish, and adhere to written policies with respect to full-time faculty members'
responsibilities. The [*270] policies shall require that the full-time faculty, as a collective body, fulfill these core
responsibilities:
(1) Teaching, preparing for classes, being available for student consultation about those classes, assessing student
performance in those classes, and remaining current in the subjects being taught;
(2) Participating in academic advising, creating an atmosphere in which students and faculty may voice opinions
and exchange ideas, and assessing student learning at the law school; 96
Arguably, Standards 314 and 404 could be not be more explicit nor have a more direct impact on faculty teaching
methods in the classroom.
In August 2014, following the adoption of the standards, the ABA released a transition memo, stating that it would
be looking for four things in its review of schools under the new Standards: (1) faculty engagement in creating
learning outcomes; (2) how the curriculum encompasses the outcomes and the integration of teaching and

64

See Byrne, supra note 20, at 323, for a full discussion of academic abstention. Byrne notes that "it would be inappropriate to
describe academic abstention as a doctrine, because courts have never developed a consistent or thorough body of rationales
or followed a uniform group of leading cases." Id. at 323; see also Jeff Todd, State University v. State Government: Applying
Academic Freedom to Curriculum, Pedagogy, & Assessment, 33 J.C. & U.L. 387, 402 (2007) (stating that "the constitutional right
of institutional academic freedom appears to be collateral descendent of the common law notion of academic abstention");
White, supra note 5, at 817-818 ("Judicial deference to academic decision making has a downside as well: by discouraging
courts from examining in detail what faculty members actually do, judicial deference fosters a jurisprudence "lacking in
consistency" and in which courts and litigants are encouraged to "invoke the doctrine [of academic freedom] in circumstances
where it arguably has no application.").
65

See Byrne, supra note 20, at 323; see also Cain, supra note 2, at 7-8. Cain argued that the AAUP's 1966 Statement on
Government of Colleges and Universities, which provides that "the faculty has primary responsibility for such fundamental areas
as curriculum, subject matter, and methods of instruction" can be interpreted to provide "faculty with control over assessment
activities through their primary responsibility for determining and enacting the curriculum, although not necessarily full control
over whether learning outcomes assessment will take place." Id.
66

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) ("Our holding today is in keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of
deference to a university's academic decisions, within constitutionally prescribed limits."); see also Regents of Univ. of Mich. v.
Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985) ("When judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic decision … they
should show great respect for the faculty's professional judgment.").
67

Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir. 1991) ("We do not find support to conclude that academic freedom is an
independent First Amendment right. And, in any event, we cannot supplant our discretion for that of the University."); see also
Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 698 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The University always retains
the ultimate decision-making authority … and the administration gives weight and import to the faculty's collective judgment as it
chooses and deems consistent with its own perception of the institution's needs and objectives."); Hong v. Grant, 516 F. Supp.
2d 1158, 1169-1170 (C.D. Cal. 2007) ("Such expansive constitutionalization would require endless judicial supervision of the
decisions university administrators must make on a daily basis to ensure the efficient and effective management of their
institution. Federal courts are ill-equipped to oversee these purely institutional decisions absent a significant federal interest.").
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assessment of the outcomes in the curriculum; (3) how and when students receive feedback, regarding their
progression on the outcomes; and (4) efforts to gather information on student learning and to use the information.
97

With the assessment mandates firmly in place, law schools and their individual faculty members are now faced with
the implementation of outcomes assessment, a seismic shift in legal education pedagogy. This shift has prompted
many questions. For example, doesn't academic freedom protect faculty members' ability to choose what and how
they teach in the classroom? And if so, doesn't that fly in the face of the new Standards, which require learning
outcomes in all syllabi and formative assessments in the classroom?
Although specific cases have not clearly addressed this issue, scholars have been outspoken, taking both sides of
the issue generally. Some claim that accreditation presents "a serious challenge to academic freedom and to the
educational goals such freedom is intended to support." 98 While others [*271] claim that "our system of
accreditation is grounded in and depends upon academic freedom" and that accreditation and academic freedom
have a "reciprocal relationship." 99 Some hypothesize that,
there is no doubt that a question related to regional and state accreditation, necessary for the awarding of degrees
with value to the students and a school's stakeholders, would receive full support from the courts. Similarly, in
today's climate of accountability, it is just as important for an institution to set guidelines requiring assessment of
student learning and to seek the approval and endorsement of external professional accrediting bodies 100 as
necessary for an institution's survival. 101
Lastly, the AAUP, the guardian of individual academic freedom rights, does not see a conflict between
accreditation (and the assessment mandates therein) and individual academic freedom rights. 102
II. Analysis

68

This Article does not address other assessment mandates, such as those of regional accreditors or even institutional review,
by deans in yearend reviews or PRT committees.
69

Judith S. Eaton, U.S. Accreditation: Meeting the Challenges of Accountability and Student Achievement, 5 Evaluation in
Higher
Educ.
1,
3
(2011),
https://www.chea.org/userfiles/CHEAkry224/EHE51_U%20S%20_Accreditation_Meeting_the_Challenges_of_Accountability_and_Student_Achievement-Judith_S%20_Eaton.pdf;
see also Judith Areen, Accreditation Reconsidered,96 Iowa L. Rev. 1471 (2011) (detailing a history of the evolution of the
accreditation process in the United States).
70

Areen, supra note 69, at 1478 n.37. The six regional accreditors have seven accrediting commissions, which include: the
Commission of Institutions of Higher Education of the New England Association of Schools and Colleges; the Middle States
Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools; the Southern Association of
Colleges and Schools Commission on Colleges; the Higher Learning Commission of the North Central Association of Colleges
and Universities; the Northwest Commission on Colleges and Universities; the Northwest Commission on Colleges and
Universities' Accrediting Commission for Community and Junior Colleges; and the Western Association of Schools and Colleges.
Id. The United States Department of Education defines accrediting agencies as "organizations (or bodies) that establish
operating standards for educational or professional institutions and programs, determine the extent to which standards are met,
and publicly announce their findings." U.S. Dep't of Educ., FAQs About Accreditation, The Database of Accredited
Postsecondary Institutions and Programs, https://ope.ed.gov/accreditation/FAQAccr.aspx (last visited April 9, 2017) [hereinafter
FAQs About Accreditation]; see also U.S. Dep't of Educ., The Database of Accredited Postsecondary Institutions and
Programs,http://ope.ed.gov/accreditation (last visited April 9, 2017) (providing another definition of accrediting agencies as
"private educational associations of regional or national scope, [which] develop evaluation criteria and conduct peer evaluations
to assess whether or not those criteria are met").
71

Areen, supra note 69, at 1479. The United States Department of Education, however, only identifies two types of accrediting
agencies: institutional and specialized or programmatic. FAQs About Accreditation, supra note 70. "Institutional accreditation
normally applies to an entire institution, indicating that each of an institution's parts is contributing to the achievement of the
institution's objectives, although not necessarily all at the same level of quality." Id. Whereas,
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Having surveyed the law on individual academic freedom rights regarding the choice of teaching methods, and
identified the ABA Standards that impact faculty members' academic freedom rights, the issue becomes: do these
Standards, when implemented by an institution, actually violate a faculty member's academic freedom rights? 103
In any academic freedom analysis, it is important to note that, as employees of an institution, faculty members have
certain job responsibilities. Academic freedom is not a release from all job-related [*272] responsibilities. To that
end, law faculty members have always been required to engage in certain job responsibilities. For example, in most
doctrinal classes, faculty members are required to provide a final grade and at least one examination as part of their
job responsibilities. 104 However, the question remains, are the new ABA Standards and the implementation of the
same different than other job responsibilities that faculty members have always been required to complete? And if
so, do these Standards, when implemented by a law school, violate a faculty member's academic freedom rights?
This Article will analyze several potential violations and provide recommendations to institutions and faculty to guide
them in their future adoption of assessment mandates.
A. Mandated Assessments and the Violation of Academic Freedom
As a starting point, it is acknowledged that the ABA Standards impact academic freedom rights involving classroom
speech (i.e., content) and teaching methods. But, does that impact rise to the level of a violation? A claim of a
violation could occur in several ways: (1) a faculty member forced to include learning outcomes in her syllabus as
required by the ABA; (2) a faculty member forced to provide more than one summative exam, requiring some type
of formative assessment in the middle of the semester to meet Standards 314 and 404; (3) a faculty member forced
to give a standardized test in her course to help the administration gather data for its institutional assessment plan
under Standard 315; and/or (4) a faculty member being penalized for openly criticizing assessment and her school's

specialized accreditation normally applies to the evaluation of programs, departments, or schools which usually are parts of a
total collegiate or other postsecondary institution … . Most of the specialized accrediting agencies review units within a
postsecondary institution which is accredited by one of the regional accrediting commissions. However, certain of the specialized
accrediting agencies accredit professional schools … . Thus, a "specialized" or "programmatic" accrediting agency may also
function in the capacity of an "institutional" accrediting agency.
Id.
72

See Eaton, supra note 69, at 4.

73

Judith Welch Wegner, The Accreditation Context and the Law School Mission, in Building on Best Practices: Transforming
Legal Education in a Changing World 3, 3 (Deborah Maranville et al. eds., 2015).
74

Id.

75

Staci Provezis, NILOA Occasional Paper No. 6, Regional Accreditation and Student Learning Outcomes: Mapping the
Territory, 7 (Oct. 2010), http://www.learningoutcomesassessment.org/documents/Provezis .pdf (compiling the standards of the
regional accreditors and noting that the regional accreditors "share similar expectations for student learning outcomes
assessment"). However, regional accreditors do not mandate specific outcomes or the types of assessment activities. Cain,
supra note 2, at 9.
76

Provezis, supra note 75, at 4; see also Cain, supra note 2, at 8-9 (noting that "meeting accreditation requirements remains
the strongest driver of assessment efforts in American higher education," which has created a tension between "assessment for
accountability and assessment for improvement").
77

ABA Sec. of Legal Educ. and Admissions to the Bar, 2015-2016 Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law
Schools, at v (2015) [hereinafter ABA Standards]. In 1952, the United States Department of Education recognized the Council of
the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar of the ABA (Council) as the accrediting body for J.D. programs. Id.
78

Susan Hanley Duncan, The New Accreditation Standards are Coming to a Law School New You - What You Need to Know
About Learning Outcomes & Assessment, 16 Legal Writing: J. Legal Writing Inst. 605, 606-607 n.8 (2010) (also explaining the
steps in the amendment process of the Standards). Along with the Standards, the Council has promulgated Interpretations to
provide guidance on the individual Standards and Rules of Procedure and to outline the process of accreditation. ABA
Standards, supra note 77.
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assessment activities and mandatory assessment in the classroom. Numerous other scenarios could play out. As
more and more law schools begin to implement the ABA standards, they are requiring more mid-term assessments
and adopting more assessment policies, so these scenarios are more than mere hypotheticals.
1. Mandated Learning Outcomes in Syllabi
The 2015 Guidance Memo requires a faculty member to have a syllabus and to include learning outcomes in the
syllabus, 105 touching on course content as well as faculty speech. Institutions are likely to adopt policies to meet
this requirement, and courts would be reluctant to find [*273] such policies to be a violation of a faculty member's
academic freedom rights.
First, a policy requiring a syllabus with learning outcomes would not violate a faculty member's academic freedom
rights concerning course content as it is doubtful that such policy would dictate the specific language of the courselevel learning outcomes. At most, it could be envisioned that a policy might direct that the course-level learning
outcomes be aligned with the institutional learning outcomes. 106
If the policy requires the outcomes to be aligned with the institutional or programmatic outcomes, a faculty
member's course content would be impacted to some extent. However, it would be minor. As noted by the ABA, the
institutional and programmatic outcomes are to be adopted with faculty input. 107 Therefore, faculty would have
had a voice in the creation of the institutional learning outcomes, such that when required to align their course-level
learning outcomes in their syllabi, they would be working with language that they had already adopted. Additionally,
the institutional and programmatic outcomes are likely written in broad language and do not address specific
doctrinal content, at least no more so than traditional course descriptions, to which faculty have adhered without
noted complaint. 108 Lastly, not every institutional learning outcome must be assessed in every course. 109

79

See ABA Standards, supra note 77, at vi-vii.

80

American Bar Association, Managing Director's Guidance Memo, Standards 301, 302, 314 and 315, June 2015, at 3,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to
_the_bar/governancedocuments/2015_learning_outcomes_guidance.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter ABA Memo].
81

ABA Sec. of Legal Educ. and Admission to the Bar, Report of the Outcome Measures Committee, 1 (2008),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/reports/2008_outcom
e_measures_committee_final_report.authcheckdam.pdf; see also ABA Memo, supra note 80, at 3.
82

ABA Memo, supra note 80, at 3.

83

Id.

84

Id.

85

Id.

86

ABA Standards, supra note 77; Areen, supra note 69, at 1490 (noting that because the ABA did not at that time focus on
quality improvement, it was out of line with other accreditors in higher education). Areen also noted the failure of ABA
accreditation to consider a school's mission, which has been remedied by the 2014 Standards. Id. at 1491.
87

The Standards include other mentions of assessment; however, such standards do not truly impact the assessment activities
of a school or its faculty and thus, are not characterized as "assessment mandates" as that term is used in this Article. See, e.g.,
ABA Standards, supra note 77, at 11 ("Before each site evaluation visit the law school shall prepare a self-study comprised of (a)
a completed site evaluation questionnaire, (b) a statement of the law school's mission and of its educational objectives in support
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Therefore, there would not be pressure on a faculty member to incorporate all of the institutional learning outcomes
if she does not find them relevant to her specific course. Based on any of these reasons, and regardless of the
exact language of the policy, such a mandate would not address content directly and therefore, could not be found
to violate a faculty member's academic freedom.
Second, such a mandate requires faculty members to communicate to their students learning outcomes, which in
and of itself, requires faculty members to communicate a specific educational philosophy, that of outcomes
assessment. It requires faculty members, at least implicitly, to convey a certain message, with which they may not
agree. As noted in Johnson-Kurek, there are limits on the extent to which a law school could require a faculty
member to endorse an institutional or ABA policy. 110 And, like in Johnson-Kurek, although the school could not
force faculty members to endorse such a pedagogical philosophy, it could still require [*274] them to include
learning outcomes in their syllabi. 111 By merely requiring faculty members to have a syllabus and to insert learning
outcomes on it would potentially be seen as non-expressive conduct, 112 as opposed to compelled speech.
Additionally, adoption of a syllabus with learning outcomes is arguably a teaching method. Generally speaking,
faculty members are more restricted in their teaching methods than their speech. This result is in large part due to
courts' unwillingness to address such issues, claiming academic abstention and to favor an institution's academic
freedom rights over a faculty member's rights. 113 Therefore, there would likely be no violation of a faculty
member's academic freedom rights.
2. Mandated Assessments
As to teaching methods specifically, in implementing Standards 314 and 404, an institution could impact a faculty
member's academic freedom rights. 114 An institution could require mid-term assessments and/or multiple

of that mission, (c) an assessment of the educational quality of the law school's program, (d) an assessment of the school's
continuing efforts to improve educational quality, (e) an evaluation of the school's effectiveness in achieving its stated
educational objectives, and (f) a description of the strengths and weaknesses of the law school's program of legal education.").
88

ABA Standards, supra note 77, at 15 ("(a) A law school shall maintain a rigorous program of legal education that prepares its
students, upon graduation, for admission to the bar and for effective, ethical, and responsible participation as members of the
legal profession. (b) A law school shall establish and publish learning outcomes designed to achieve these objectives.").
89

Id. ("A law school shall establish learning outcomes that shall, at a minimum, include competency in the following: (a)
Knowledge and understanding of substantive and procedural law; (b) Legal analysis and reasoning, legal research, problemsolving, and written and oral communication in the legal context; (c) Exercise of proper professional and ethical responsibilities
to clients and the legal system; and (d) Other professional skills needed for competent and ethical participation as a member of
the legal profession.").
90

ABA Sec. of Legal Educ. and Admissions to the Bar, 2012-2013 Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law
Schools, at 19 (2012).
91

Id. ("A law school may also identify any additional learning outcomes pertinent to its program of legal education.").

92

See ABA Memo, supra note 80, at 4.

93

ABA Standards, supra note 77, at 23 ("A law school shall utilize both formative and summative assessment methods in its
curriculum to measure and improve student learning and provide meaningful feedback to students."). Interpretation 314-1 states,
Formative assessment methods are measurements at different points during a particular course or at different points over the
span of a student's education that provide meaningful feedback to improve student learning. Summative assessment methods
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formative assessments in courses. Law schools around the country are adopting such policies, often as an
unwritten policy or custom. However, whether a mandate in this regard would violate an academic freedom right is
somewhat unclear, considering the inconsistent treatment by courts on teaching methods generally.
Similar to the analysis of requiring a faculty member to have a syllabus, if the mandate merely requires faculty to
create and to administer mid-term assessments, it would be non-expressive conduct, not speech, and therefore,
likely not violative of any academic freedom rights. Additionally, as noted above, such a mandate would likely be
upheld because of academic abstention and the deference to an institution's academic freedom rights over that of
the individual. Furthermore, to the extent that such a policy was adopted by the faculty, the faculty would have had
a voice in its adoption. Therefore, their complaints regarding its implementation would be weakened.
3. Standardized Assessments
In addition to requiring multiple assessments in courses, institutions may require faculty to participate in institutional
assessment under Standard 315, by administering a standardized assessment tool in their individual courses. Like
the standardized student evaluation forms in Wirsing, 115 requiring a faculty member to provide a standardized tool
[*275] would likely not violate academic freedom. However, there is a distinction between the use of a
standardized student evaluation form, which has little to no connection to course content as in Wirsing, 116 and a
standardized assessment tool, which to be valid and reliable, would have to address course content. Obviously,
students should not be assessed on materials that they have not learned.

are measurements at the culmination of a particular course or at the culmination of any part of a student's legal education that
measure the degree of student learning.
Id.
94

Id. ("The dean and the faculty of a law school shall conduct ongoing evaluation of the law school's program of legal
education, learning outcomes, and assessment methods; and shall use the results of this evaluation to determine the degree of
student attainment of competency in the learning outcomes and to make appropriate changes to improve the curriculum.").
95

See ABA Memo, supra note 80.

96

ABA Standards, supra note 77, at 28 (emphasis added).

97

ABA Sec. of Legal Educ. and Admissions to the Bar, Transition to and Implementation of the New Standards and Rules of
Procedure
for
Approval
of
law
Schools
1,
2
(2014)
[hereinafter
ABA
Rules],
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/governancedocument
s/2014_august _transition_and_implementation_of_new_aba_standards_and_rules.authcheckdam.pdf.
98

William W. Pendleton, The Freedom to Teach, 88 New Directions in Higher Educ. 11, 18 (1994). Pendleton states that the
assessment movement is a result of "well-intentioned but intellectually poorly informed people acting through bureaucratic
structures to achieve high-sounding goals." Id.; see also Michael W. Ledoux et al., The Erosion of Academic Freedom, 88 Educ.
Horizons 249, 252 (2010) ("Accrediting agencies can deprive institutions, faculty, and students of academic freedom by attacking
the individual's self-identity. Such pressure may presume to improve curriculum development and conceptual frameworks, but it
can also harbor hidden personal and political agendas.").
99

Sandra E. Elman, Academic Freedom and Regional Accreditation: Guarantors of Quality in the Academy, 88 New Directions
in Higher Educ. 89, 90 (1994).
100

See Denise S. Smith & Michael A. Katz, Academic Freedom in the Age of Assessment and Accountability, 22 Midwest L.J.
1, 19 (2008).
101

Id. at 28. Smith and Katz argue that "the institutions decisions to institute comprehensive assessment programs or to seek
and maintain professional accreditations should be considered necessary for the optimal organization and maintenance of the
institution and free from academic freedom infringement claims by faculty." Id. They also note that
when administered fairly amongst the faculty, justified in its application and fruitful in its results, assessment and maintenance of
professional accreditations are necessary for the survival of institutions and should be considered a vital part of the professor's
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Regardless of its relation to course content, if the standardized assessment is created by the administration, merely
requiring the faculty member to administer it in class time would be conduct, not compelled speech (or course
content), and would likely be found to be non-expressive conduct. Therefore, like mandating assessments
generally, mandating the use of a specific assessment tool is unlikely to violate a faculty member's academic
freedom.
4. Criticism of Assessment and Assessment Policies
Concluding that faculty members may be limited in their refusal to participate in their institution's assessment
mandates does not foreclose or eviscerate the individual right of academic freedom. A faculty member who
disagrees with outcomes assessment generally and the language in the syllabi, mandated assessments, or
standardized assessments specifically, would be able to openly criticize the same without fear of repercussion and
with full protection of academic freedom. As noted in Wirsing, a faculty member has the right to openly criticize
faculty policy in her classroom. 117 Here, her rights would likely be at their strongest. 118
B. Recommendations for the Adoption of Assessment Mandates
Just because it is unlikely that faculty members would succeed in claiming violation of their academic freedom
rights regarding their teaching activities and speech does not mean that institutions and faculty members should not
do all in their power to protect those rights. Although the ABA has only recently addressed assessment, it has long
shown respect for and restraint in the field of academic freedom in relation to faculty and their teaching. 119 As
noted by the AAUP "any assessment scheme must provide certain protections for the role of the faculty and for the
institutional mission as agreed upon by the faculty, administration, and [*276] governing board, and endorsed by
the regional accrediting agency." 120 When enacting policy to comply with the ABA assessment mandates,
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institutions and faculty should follow the lead of their primary accreditor, the ABA, and ensure that individual
academic freedom rights are protected. Specifically, they should follow the ABA's lead and adopt faculty-driven
assessment policies, avoid standardized assessments, support innovation and experimentation, and educate all
interested parties.
1. The ABA's Protections of Academic Freedom
The ABA has placed restraints on its own mandates to ensure individual academic freedom rights are protected.
Several Standards address it in a passing manner, while Standard 405 is more direct. For example, Standard 201
recognizes the shared responsibility of the dean and the faculty "for planning, implementing, and administering the
program of legal education of the law school, including curriculum, methods of instruction and evaluation, … and
academic standards." 121 With this Standard, the ABA recognizes that methods of instruction are a shared
responsibility by the administration and the faculty. Therefore, a mandate requiring mid-term assessments (one or
multiple) should likely come from a collective faculty decision, not an administrative fiat.
Similarly, the ABA Interpretations of the Standards show respect for and protection of academic freedom rights. For
example, such Interpretations recognize the importance of the individualized identity of institutions. To that end,
Interpretation 302-2 notes that schools can identify their own learning outcomes and does not mandate specific
course or curriculum content.
Additionally, Interpretation 314-2 clarifies that Standard 314 does not require "multiple assessment methods in any
particular course." 122 The Interpretation notes that schools are not required to use any specific assessment
activities and recognizes such activities are likely to vary from school to school. 123 Here, the ABA is
acknowledging the individuality of schools and their assessment activities. Similarly, Interpretation 315-1, which
provides examples of assessment tools that schools can use for institutional assessment, does not require law
schools to adopt any particular assessment method and again notes that such activities are likely [*277] to vary
from school to school. 124 Here again, the ABA notes the individuality of schools and their assessment activities.
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Unlike these statements by the ABA, Standard 405, Professional Environment, is more direct in its protection of
individual academic freedom rights. 125 Standard 405 provides that "[a] law school shall have an established and
announced policy with respect to academic freedom and tenure of which Appendix 1 herein is an example but is not
obligatory." 126 Appendix 1 is the text of the AAUP's 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and
Tenure. 127 As noted earlier, this Statement recognizes that "academic freedom in its teaching aspect is
fundamental for the protection of the rights of the teacher in teaching and of the student to freedom in learning. It
carries with it duties correlative with rights." 128 Also in this Appendix, in providing for transparency, the ABA states
that if an institution places any limits on individual academic freedom, such limits should be explicitly set forth "in
writing at the time of the appointment." 129 Therefore, the ABA can be said to fully recognize, appreciate, and
protect individual academic freedom rights. 130
2. Adopt Faculty-Driven Assessment Policies
Institutions should recognize the primary role that faculty play in pedagogical decisions generally and assessment
policies specifically. 131 In addition to being endorsed by the ABA, this statement is echoed by the AAUP, noting
that "the faculty should have primary responsibility for establishing the criteria for assessment and the methods for
implementing it." 132 Faculty should be involved in every aspect of the assessment process - in creating the
institutional learning outcomes, participating in curriculum mapping, engaging in institutional as well as course-level
assessment activities, analyzing assessment data, and using the assessment data to improve student learning at
the institutional level, as well as at the course level.
[*278] If faculty members are hired, in part, for their teaching, should they not be able to decide how to assess
student work product in their courses and adopt assessments that align with their own educational philosophy? The
answer seems simple, and if institutions agree that faculty members are hired in part for their teaching, then they
must acknowledge that collaboration with faculty members in the shared governance of the institution is necessary.
"Governance - providing faculty participation in institutional decision making - merits the protection of academic
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freedom because faculty possess the expertise necessary to make informed decisions about curricula and to
evaluate students and peers based on that knowledge." 133
As a corollary to an institution's responsibility to collaborate with faculty, faculty members have a responsibility to
collaborate in the process, as part of their responsibilities of shared governance. Faculty members need to
comprehend that shared governance is a right as well as a responsibility, which requires faculty members to take
part in planning and curriculum, as well as assessment activities. "Assessment rightly conducted … asks faculty to
work together as colleagues to assess student work fairly by criteria respected in the field, and to share their
knowledge of student strengths and weaknesses, in order to improve curriculum, pedagogy, and other factors that
affect learning." 134 The ABA 2014 Transition Memo envisions this collaboration and expects faculty engagement
in creating learning outcomes and arguably would expect faculty engagement in the assessment process as a
whole. 135
Faculty members should not sit back and take no part in the assessment dialogue and then assert a violation of
their academic freedom rights when assessment policies are implemented. In order to work effectively, faculty
members need to realize that "academic freedom becomes the right and obligation to participate in academic selfgovernment." 136 Additionally, "the historic position of faculties in higher education sufficiently guarantees the
continuing primacy of the faculty in the assessment process. If, the argument runs, faculty members develop and
administer the assessment instruments, and these are used primarily for pedagogic self-improvement, then what
can the objection be?" 137 Faculty members should become team players in the assessment process to reach the
overall goal of all educators - to improve student learning. Ultimately, [*279] assessment is here to stay for the time
being. Faculty members are best served by putting their energy and expertise into improving their students'
learning, which is the goal of all educators, instead of resisting the implementation of assessment policies. Their
time is better spent "in determining how student assessment may be accomplished, but not whether it will happen."
138

To document the parties' collaboration and responsibilities, all assessment policies, and specifically any
assessment mandates, should be incorporated into an institution's policy manual. Furthermore, as endorsed by the
ABA, to squelch any potential claims of academic freedom violations, any assessment mandates, which could be
argued to limit academic freedom, should be placed in the appointment contracts for new hires. Therefore, from day
one, a faculty member would be cognizant of her institution's assessment policies and mandates.
By making faculty partners in the institution's assessment policies, there will hopefully be fewer challenges in its
implementation. Optimistically, this collaboration would result in a culture of assessment within the institution where all are engaged in the improvement of student learning.
3. Support Innovation and Experimentation
In addition to recognizing faculty's primary role in assessment, administrators should make allowances for faculty
experimentation and potential mishaps when implementing assessment mandates. Just as the ABA notes the
learning curve regarding outcomes assessment by providing allowances for schools' "efforts" in the 2014 Transition
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Memo, 139 institutions should provide the same allowance for a faculty member's efforts to comply with
assessment mandates. Faculty members should feel the freedom and security to experiment with new teaching
pedagogies and assessment techniques.
To the extent a faculty member experiments with innovative pedagogies, he or she should not be penalized for
trying to follow the school's assessment mandates. We must all remember that formative assessment is relatively
new in the history of legal education, which has a long tradition of summative assessment. It will take time as faculty
learn and become more comfortable with implementing their own style of formative assessment. And, that is what it
should be, an individualized assessment practice - assessment that conforms with the individual faculty member's
teaching style and educational philosophy.
Additionally, in implementing assessment mandates, there should be respect for all that faculty already do, which
includes their scholarship and [*280] service to the institution, the bar, the legal profession, and the community.
Institutions should exercise restraint in their assessment policies, recognizing what is a reasonable expectation of
already busy faculty. "Unrealistic or overly ambiguous assessment expectations can work to the detriment of caring,
creative, and effective law teachers. Although not a direct attack on academic freedom, identifying and articulating
objectives to be assessed will be time consuming for faculty unaccustomed" to such activities. 140 Imposing a
requirement that all faculty have a syllabus with learning outcomes is not onerous. Nor would be the requirement of
at least one formative assessment. But, overly aggressive assessment mandates can do more harm than good.
The key is adopting reasonable assessment mandates that can be implemented by faculty. As faculty become more
accustomed to outcomes assessment, policies can be altered, if needed. However, it is better to start slow, which
gives the policies, as well as faculty implementing them, a chance to succeed.
4. Avoid Standardized Assessment
In line with the ABA directives in the Interpretations, disavowing mandated assessment tools, institutions should
not mandate the use of standardized assessments. Faculty members should have the choice of the assessment
tools used in their classes. To the extent the administration wants to use standardized assessments, as previously
noted, they would likely be able to require a faculty member to proctor a standardized assessment, but cannot
require the faculty member to grade or comment on the same.
In addition, who is to say that standardized assessments are the best tools available? Legal education has been
dominated by two standardized assessments, the LSAT and the bar examination. Faculty members have often
questioned the validity and reliability of such measures. Therefore, why would we want to incorporate more of the
same? As recommended by the AAUP, "the assessment process should employ methods adequate to the
complexity and variety of student learning experiences, rather than rely on any single method of assessment." 141
Relying on faculty-driven assessment policies in lieu of administrative fiats with mandated tools better supports a
collaborative culture of assessment.
5. Educate All on Assessment and Academic Freedom
10. Upon undertaking assessment mandates, education is paramount - for all parties. In order to minimize
challenges and resistance by faculty, institutions should "engage in a dialogue with faculty before a serious [*281]
dispute arises about faculty roles in accreditation, assessment, [and] non-traditional educational offerings … ." 142
First, faculty need programming explaining the ABA assessment mandates specifically and generally - their goals,
purposes, and even the mechanics. Fear is a large part of resistance. Showing faculty how to engage in
assessment, which provides the greatest rewards in student learning without overworking faculty, is crucial.
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"Evidence from workshop evaluations reveals that some reluctant participants have developed newfound
enthusiasm for student assessment at the classroom and institutional levels … ." 143 Creating learning
communities to share experiences can lead to greater support. In addition, to support faculty, institutions can
provide internal training and workshops and fund faculty attendance at teaching conferences.
Additionally, educating faculty on what academic freedom is, as well as its parameters, is paramount. Faculty
development is needed to define academic freedom and what and who it protects and to aid faculty in realizing that
"academic freedom is not the freedom to do whatever you want with your students." 144 For institutions, it is
important to note that limits are imposed on what can be required of faculty. Although courts are favorable to
institutional authority and often exercise academic abstention, institutions should remain dedicated to working with
their faculty, not against them.
Conclusion
Law schools and their faculty need to come to terms with the new assessment mandates in the ABA Standards.
Institutions will likely adopt policies to implement the ABA assessment mandates in the Standards. Such policies
will likely impact faculty members' teaching activities, which in turn, will likely impact their academic freedom rights.
This may prompt faculty to challenge the same on the basis of academic freedom. As shown, such challenges are
not likely to succeed.
Regardless of the potential success or failure of such challenges, in adopting assessment policies, institutions
should provide safeguards to protect academic freedom by working with and not against faculty in the assessment
process. Such collaboration is at the core of the ABA Standards. Likewise, faculty should face these assessment
policies in a spirit of collaboration, not contempt. If mandated assessment policies emerge, all parties should be
reminded that "the purpose of mandated assessment is the improvement of teaching and learning in an atmosphere
[*282] of constructive cooperation." 145 Shared governance is the key to this new legal education landscape, and
like academic freedom itself, it presents opportunities for rights with correlative responsibilities for all.
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